A$97,587.11 makes an unusual line in a history of artificial intelligence. It was the last instalment on an Australian government contract. Deloitte had been engaged to examine the system behind employment-services compliance decisions. Questions about references in its final report reached the department. On 8 September 2025 a senior official wrote to the firm asking for the money back. The public contract record reports that the instalment was repaid. This is one place where a reader can follow an argument about the quality of AI-assisted work all the way to a change in the client's bill. 46 47 49
The department signed for A$439,142 including GST. Its briefing lists 25 interviews, more than 150 documents and 370 business rules examined. It records A$341,554.89 of expenditure after the repayment. There was a system to understand, a large body of evidence to evaluate and an official entitled to decide whether the final report met the terms of the engagement. Compress the episode into a story about a machine writing a document and nearly every important participant disappears.
The correspondence is unusually specific about the work. The department had agreed to the use of particular tools to help analyse code. According to its letter, Deloitte subsequently described using generative AI on two publishing tasks involving a legal case and citations, and acknowledged that the tools likely contributed to the errors. The department tied its demand to the professional standard required for the final deliverable. The refund tells us how much one buyer recovered. The costs of checking the references again, handling correspondence and correcting the published record extend beyond that number. The documents supply no complete price for those costs. 46 49
Start there when a model company announces its intention to disrupt consulting. Its commercial opportunity includes a signature that Deloitte had supplied to the Australian government. Will the new supplier put its own name on the report? Will it repay a fee when the evidence fails? The answers determine whether it can bid for the engagement or must sell a much smaller service to the firm that accepts those terms.
The size of the cheque
Source Global Research put worldwide consulting at about $315 billion in its March 2026 forecast. By August the same research firm expected the year to finish above $350 billion. Both articles put growth at roughly six per cent. They give no reconciliation of the market levels. I use the August statement as a dated estimate of scale. Reading the gap between the two estimates as $35 billion of new contracts would require a common base and evidence of what changed between publications. 27 50
The client has a more immediate problem of definition. A bank may hire an adviser to diagnose a queue, an integrator to rebuild the case system and a service company to operate it at night. One master agreement might cover all three. An industry estimate of advisory work and a second estimate of outsourced operations can each be defensible. Treating the entire master agreement as up for grabs in both markets puts the same purchase in two places. Before asking for a percentage of a consulting market, I would ask the head of operations which budget paid the team and which deliverable renews.
One consultant invoice, two businesses
Two kinds of work pass through Accenture’s accounts. Compare what the company earned with the new business it booked in the same period.
Revenue earned
Three months ended 31 August 2026
$18.68bnNew bookings
Three months ended 31 August 2026
$22.17bnHolding the consulting quarter constant gives $37.12bn per year. Reported consulting revenue for FY2026 was $36.88bn.
For the quarter ended 31 August 2026 Accenture reported $9.28 billion of consulting revenue and $9.40 billion of managed-services revenue. Together they account for the quarter's $18.68 billion. Holding that quarter constant for a year gives $37.12 billion of consulting revenue. The four quarters the company actually delivered produced $36.88 billion. There are good uses for an annualised quarter, especially when growth is fast. Here the full year is available beside it, and the reader can see precisely what the approximation costs. 09
Consulting bookings over the same quarter came to $9.40 billion. By coincidence that is also the reported managed-services revenue, rounded to the nearest $10 million. One number concerns selling work, the other concerns earning fees. An agreement for several years of service can put business on the books on the day of signature, while the people responsible for it will be working across several sets of accounts. Accenture explains that it uses several fee arrangements and that recognition depends on performance obligations. A buyer's payment date, a project's recognised revenue and the cash the firm ultimately collects can fall in three different periods. 09 44
Consider another service provider. Globant's 2025 filing assigns $1.639 billion of revenue to time and materials, about $686 million to fixed-price contracts and roughly $130 million to licences, resales and other work. Time and materials generated 66.7 per cent of its $2.455 billion total. Globant is itself an international business. I use it because a reader can inspect its division by contract type. A heading such as digital engineering gives a buyer little guidance about who takes the first financial benefit when a task becomes quicker. Two contracts for the same business can give opposite answers. 45
A timesheet with two owners
Imagine an engagement at our bank. An analyst finds the original payment instruction, retrieves an amendment, attaches the dates to the right entries and passes the file for review. The customer asked a question about one debit. The manager wants the answer to survive a complaint several weeks later. When the analyst has to retrieve the same amendment a second time because its identifier was missing from the first handover, there is a plausible saving. When a second person checks whether the debit was authorised, there is a control. A proposal to eliminate both steps under the heading of duplicate work deserves two separate prices.
Ask the team to mark the hours on actual files. Suppose it can remove 400 hours of repeat evidence assembly from a time-and-materials engagement billed at $150 per hour. The immediate exposure on that line is $60,000. Give the AI supplier $20,000 to operate the replacement service, then allow $12,000 for the additional senior validation the new route requires. The client retains $28,000 if the old hours genuinely disappear, quality holds and the bank can cancel them under the order. The three amounts belong to three different parties. Only the $20,000 is a sale by the AI supplier.
Give procurement another afternoon. The existing partner might repair the handover with a compulsory identifier, fetch the amendment once and cut the same hours by half without introducing a model. That would save $30,000 with no new purchase in this example. A proposal previously credited with saving the bank $28,000 now leaves it $2,000 worse off than ordinary repair. A bidder can still win by improving the price, handling harder cases or delivering something else the bank values. It cannot use the avoidable cost of a bad handover as an entitlement to a new fee.
The empirical case for faster preparation is quite specific. Fabrizio Dell’Acqua and colleagues tested AI assistance with 758 consultants in a preregistered experiment with Boston Consulting Group. On a set of eighteen suitable tasks, consultants given GPT-4 completed 12.2 per cent more tasks and worked 25.1 per cent faster on average. A different assignment required a correct recommendation from financial data and interviews. The unassisted group chose correctly 84.5 per cent of the time. The two assisted groups reached 70.6 and 60.0 per cent. A firm making the staff faster on the first set still needs a way to recognise the second kind of assignment when it arrives disguised as ordinary work. 48
The experiment used particular tasks, tools and evaluators. It gives us a reason to test two columns on the bank's own return. In one, enter time spent on work the client accepts. In the other, enter what happened when somebody challenged the answer. The second column needs a closing date. If a complaint takes twenty days to arrive, a pilot that closes its books after five days can award the supplier a large improvement merely for sending the next team the consequences.
The narrow desk
The staffing pyramid after automation
One week brings 180 bank files. Five analysts prepare them, two reviewers examine the evidence and a partner signs each completed file. Speed up the first desk, then inspect the invoice.
60 minutes of preparation per file, 48 reviewer hours, hourly billing.
Review limits the number released. 60 files wait for a later cohort. 180 direct service hours billed.
| Delivery stage | File capacity | Hours used / reserved | Hourly charges |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preparation | 150 | 120 / 150 | $14,400 |
| Review | 120 | 48 / 48 | $10,800 |
| Sign-off | 180 | 12 / 18 | $4,320 |
Staffing, acceptance and billing terms
The team releases only files it can finish. A cohort qualifies after a common 30-day reopening window. Reviews require 24 minutes, partner sign-off six. Rates per worked hour are $120 for preparation, $225 for review and $360 for sign-off. Milestones pay $15,000 per 60 accepted files, with an empty opening balance. Completed files awaiting the next milestone carry forward. Fees exclude taxes. Unused capacity carries no hourly charge. Payroll, software and warranty costs are outside this weekly invoice.
Drag or use the arrow keys to orbit. Scroll, pinch or use the plus and minus keys to zoom. Home restores the initial view.
Give the bank 180 comparable files in a weekly cohort. Five analysts have 150 hours between them. Two reviewers reserve 48 hours for this client. A partner has eighteen hours for sign-off. For the purposes of the example, acceptance becomes final after the same thirty-day reopening window in both routes. We are looking back at the outcome of a mature cohort. The team releases only as many files as all three desks can finish, so a file held for the next cohort accrues no billed preparation this week.
At an hour of preparation per file, the analysts have room for 150. Each reviewer needs 24 minutes per file, so the middle desk can get through 120. The partner takes six minutes and can handle all 180. The engagement delivers 120 accepted files and holds sixty. Give the analysts a tool that cuts preparation time in half. They could prepare 300 files in their allocated hours. They still send 120 through to acceptance. A buyer who simply multiplies the improvement at the first desk by the size of the queue has promised sixty customers service that nobody is available to approve.
Now issue the invoices. At hourly rates of $120 for preparation, $225 for review and $360 for sign-off, the original 120 files cost $29,520. With faster preparation, billed analyst hours fall from 120 to sixty. The $7,200 difference in the buyer's invoice is exactly the hour reduction multiplied by the agreed rate. Fixed salaries can continue across the week. A partner who measures success by utilisation now needs another paying engagement on which those freed hours can be worked. Moving them to internal training might be a sensible investment in the business. It produces no replacement invoice this week.
Under a different contract the bank pays $15,000 for each milestone of sixty accepted files. With two milestones delivered, the same customer owes $30,000 under either preparation method. The firm can benefit if its cost of delivery falls, although the size of that benefit depends on staffing, tool charges and what the freed people do. At other volumes the timing of payment matters. A completed file in a partially filled milestone can carry into the next invoice. The chart shows work done and milestones earned separately so that moving a payment across a billing date cannot manufacture a productivity gain.
Add reviewer time and the bottleneck moves. At 72 review hours the middle desk can release 180 files. With sixty minutes of preparation, the first desk can still produce only 150. With thirty minutes, all 180 can clear. That difference is material to a bank facing a backlog. Before it buys the faster tool on this evidence it should price the extra 24 hours of professional review and identify where they will come from. The second engagement may be won by the firm able to supply a reviewer at the right moment, even where the bank can buy the preparation software from several vendors.
The specialist enters the tender
The small specialist’s counterbid
Three bidders price the same annual order. Find the volumes at which a specialist can cover its warranty, staff the reviews and offer the bank the lowest fee.
Where the specialist can win
Annual tender · USDEach curve traces a bidder’s delivery cost, including expected repairs. A curve ends when the bidder exhausts its review hours.
Shaded volumes qualify for a specialist award
2,000 accepted files, 5% reopened and $30,000 in specialist account costs.
- AI specialist’s contract fee
- $98,400
- Buyer saving from its entry
- $4,800
The specialist has $16,400 left after delivery and its repair provision. Its fee includes $4,000 of purchased model service. The specialist can win orders of 1,501–2,400 accepted files in the plotted range.
| Bidder | Delivery cost | Annual capacity | Qualifying bid |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global prime | $86,000 | 10,666 | $103,200 |
| Integrator | $92,000 | 6,000 | $110,400 |
| AI specialist | $82,000 | 2,400 | $98,400 |
Reproduce the bids and capacity limits
Delivery cost equals account overhead plus volume times the per-file cost and expected repair allowance. The specialist, integrator and prime respectively pay $16, $38 and $29 per file before returns. One repair costs $200, $80 or $100. Annual account costs are set at $30,000, $8,000 and $18,000 in the opening scenario. All providers allocate 12 review minutes per file and 60, 40 or 30 extra minutes per return, against annual pools of 600, 1,400 and 2,400 hours. Those labour costs are already in the unit rates. Each original file can reopen once. The specialist’s $16 includes $2 paid to its model supplier. The other bidders’ purchases from AI vendors are unspecified. The exhibit assumes stable case mix, adequate cover at other stages and the stipulated annual workload. Concentrated failures would require an additional stress test.
Move from staffing one weekly cohort to pricing a separate annual contract. This time three firms must quote for the whole order. The bank specifies the same evidence, service window and thirty-day repair obligation. A small deployment firm proposes to run the work itself. A regional integrator and a global prime can deliver it through larger teams. Give all three the same twenty per cent markup on their expected delivery costs, including provision for repairs. That choice makes the differences in cost visible. In a real negotiation each bidder is free to price its advantage wherever it thinks the buyer's alternative permits.
The specialist has the most expensive entry ticket in this example. It must spend $30,000 to qualify, connect and support its first bank account. Its underlying delivery cost is $16 per file, which includes $2 of purchased model service. It allows $200 per reopened file for investigation and repair. A regional integrator already serving the bank carries only $8,000 of account cost, pays $38 per file and allows $80 per return. The global prime puts $18,000 against the account, $29 against each file and $100 against a return. Incumbents can spread some infrastructure and incident cover across customers. A small firm might have an excellent automated process and still have to buy an expensive hour from a specialist when it fails.
At a five per cent reopening rate those figures give variable costs of $26, $42 and $34 per accepted file. For an order of 2,000 the small firm therefore expects $82,000 of delivery cost. Its $98,400 bid leaves $16,400 of contribution before corporate overhead. The global prime asks $103,200 and the integrator $110,400. If the bank awards the lowest qualifying offer, it saves $4,800 against the next offer and the new prime receives the $98,400 contract fee. Of that, $4,000 pays for the purchased model service. If a reader's definition of AI company includes only the upstream model developer, the associated sale here is $4,000. Adding the two receipts as a measure of the bank's technology spending would count the model service twice.
Trace the curves from left to right. A small order favours the integrator's low entry cost. At 1,250 files the global prime ties it and wins under the stated tie rule. At 1,500 files the specialist just matches the global prime. The next file tips the price advantage towards the specialist. The advantage lasts until its team runs out of review time. At the assumed return rate each file requires an average fifteen minutes of specialist review and repair cover. Six hundred hours cover 2,400 accepted files. For an order of 2,401 the specialist must supply more capacity before it can submit a qualifying whole-order bid. The bank would have to amend the tender to award a fraction.
Increase the estimated reopening rate to ten per cent. The specialist now expects to spend $36 per accepted file before account costs, and its reviewer can cover 2,000. At that volume its price rises to $122,400. The prime's price is $115,200. An extra five returned files per hundred has changed the identity of the winning contractor. These are conditional prices built for inspection. The actual rate at which files reopen, the correlation of failures in an exceptional week and the ability of a reviewer to reach the underlying evidence would all belong in a serious bid.
Where the partnership can still win
The most uncomfortable prospect for the big consulting firm is a smaller rival that learns something expensive on its first account and can use the lesson on its second. If the regional payments scheme changes one field name, the specialist might update the mapping once and correct many client files. Its return-handling cost could fall. However, one shared mistake can also reopen files at every customer on the same morning. The economic value of a warranty depends on the team available that morning. A proposed reserve that covers the average repair bill can leave a small firm short of the people required on its worst day.
The incumbent owns useful assets in precisely that part of the distribution. Its people may already have permission to access historical records. A named partner may have the authority to halt a rollout. It can subcontract model access, offer the bank a lower price at renewal and keep the larger prime fee. A bank would need the supplier invoices to discover how much revenue reached the lab in that arrangement. The answer might be an attractive recurring software business. It would offer much weaker evidence for a prediction that labs are taking over the consulting relationship.
My test is the second purchase order. Record who signed the first engagement, the hours and expenses the bank paid, the share of files still accepted after thirty days and the refunds and repairs that came later. Then look for the same work in the next tender. A specialist that wins the renewal at a price covering its service and its warranty has taken a piece of the consulting market. A firm that sells its software to the incumbent has won a customer of another kind. And if the bank learns to do the work itself and buys only a modest amount of compute, it is the bank that has captured most of the opportunity. All three outcomes can begin with a demonstration in which an analyst works twice as fast.